Abstract-This paper considers a multiuser single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for helping users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay power allocation and pricing problems and model the interaction between the users and the relay as a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the relay, which is modeled as the service provider and the leader of the game, sets the relay price to maximize its revenue, whereas the users are modeled as customers and followers who buy power from the relay for higher transmission rates. We use a bargaining game to model the negotiation among users to achieve a fair allocation of relay power. Based on the proposed fair relay power allocation rule, the optimal relay power price that maximizes the relay revenue is derived analytically. Simulation shows that the proposed power allocation scheme achieves higher network sum rate and relay revenue than the even power allocation. Furthermore, compared with the sum-rate-optimal solution, simulation shows that the proposed scheme achieves better fairness with comparable network sum rate for a wide range of network scenarios. The proposed pricing and power allocation solutions are also shown to be consistent with the laws of supply and demand.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OOPERATIVE communication has been shown to be a promising concept for future wireless networks (e.g., [1] and [2] ). The basic idea is to have multiple nodes in the network help each other's transmission to achieve diversity. Numerous cooperative relaying strategies aiming at optimizing the global network performance have been proposed. Two widely used strategies are amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-andforward (DF). For AF, the relays simply forward amplified versions of the signals they receive. For DF, the relays decode their received signals and transmit the re-encoded signals [3] . While pioneering efforts in cooperative networks focus on single-user networks (e.g., [4] - [9] ), research on multiuser networks, in which multiple transmissions of different users can be supported, is important to meet the demands of future communication systems. One such model is the multiuser single-relay network (e.g., [10] - [16] ). Capacity bounds of the network are investigated in [10] and [11] , and interference cancellation schemes are proposed in [12] and [13] . In [14] and [15] , network decoding is applied to combat interference among users in multiuser single-relay networks. In [16] , the resource allocation problem, including both the subcarrier allocation and the relay power allocation, in a multiuser single-relay network is studied to maximize the sum rate.
In the aforementioned papers, nodes in a network are assumed to be altruistic and willing to cooperate to optimize the overall network performance. In many practical applications, however, nodes are selfish and aim to optimize their own benefits or quality of service. On the other hand, due to the limited resources available, multiple selfish users in the network have conflicts in resource allocation. It is important to find solutions that achieve both high overall network performance and fairness among users. To model and analyze these behaviors, game theory is often used [17] .
Research into cooperative network designs using game theory has become increasingly popular in recent years. Many papers have appeared in the literature, e.g., [18] - [21] and [23] - [28] . In [18] , the uplink of a network with multiple users and a single base station, in which users can form coalitions and share resources to form a virtual multiantenna system, is considered. A merge-and-split algorithm is proposed to construct coalitions among users to maximize utilities, which are defined as the transmission rates. In [19] and [20] , a two-user network where each user can also work as a relay for the other is studied. By employing a two-user bargaining game, fair bandwidth allocation [19] and power allocation [20] are found from the Nash bargaining solution. In [21] , the relay power allocation problem in the downlink of a multiuser multirelay cellular network is studied. Noncooperative game theory is used to model the competition for relay power among users. An iterative scheme is proposed to ensure that all users reach the Nash equilibrium point. In [22] , the relay power allocation problem in a multiuser multirelay network where two kinds of users are considered-variable-rate users and constant-rate users-is studied. A distributed method is proposed to implement fair resource allocation based on the Nash bargaining solution.
None of the aforementioned works consider the cooperation stimulation problem. In a relay network, one possible solution to user cooperation stimulation is the payment-based scheme, where the relays get paid if they forward the users' messages and the users pay for the relay service. Here, relays and users aim to maximize their own payoffs instead of the overall network performance. In [23] - [29] , the pricing mechanism is 0018-9545/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE used to encourage the relays to help forward packets for the users. For a two-hop multiuser ad hoc network, compensation frameworks are proposed in [23] and [24] , in which a network node sets price and receives revenue if it cooperatively helps the others' transmissions. For a multihop wireless ad hoc network, in [25] , the joint routing and packet forwarding problem is studied. A game theoretical framework is proposed to provide incentives for cooperation. For a two-hop multiuser multirelay network, based on the simplification that transmission of a frame is either successful or unsuccessful, [26] uses a pricing mechanism and the Stackelberg game to encourage the relays to cooperate. In [26] , the users set the payment rates for the relays to forward their packets, and the payment is shared among relays who choose to help the users. In [27] , for a single-user multirelay network, the relay selection and relay power control are investigated using a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the relays compete to provide service to the user to gain revenue. In [28] , the user power control and relay pricing problems in a multiuser single-relay network are studied. In the game theoretic model, the relay sets the price to maximize its revenue, whereas a noncooperative game is used to model the user behavior, in which each user adjusts its transmit power to selfishly maximize its own utility. In [29] , the incentives for nodes that belong to two different mesh networks to cooperate is considered. An analytical framework is proposed to determine when cooperation is beneficial, and the expected performance gains are estimated.
In this paper, we consider a multiuser single-relay network and use game theory to model and analyze the user and relay behavior. AF is adopted due to its simplicity and low computational load. A pricing mechanism is used, where the relay gets paid for signal forwarding, and the users pay for the relay service. We model the interaction between the relay and the users as a two-level Stackelberg game, in which the relay is the leader and sets the unit power price for the relay service, and users are the followers, where each user decides how much power to purchase from the relay. This paper is different from [23] - [27] and [29] in the network and channel models. Compared with [28] , this paper considers the relay power allocation among users instead of the user power control, and also, the relay power competition among users is modeled as a cooperative bargaining game. For the relay power allocation, the Kailai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS) is used for fairness. The power allocation problem is transformed into a convex optimization problem. With the KSBS-based relay power allocation, we analytically find the optimal relay price that maximizes the relay revenue. From our simulations, compared with the sum-rate-optimal power allocation, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation is fairer and achieves close-to-optimal sum rate for a wide range of network scenarios. Compared with the even power allocation, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation achieves higher relay revenue and network sum rate. It is also shown via simulations that the proposed relay pricing and power allocation solutions are consistent with the laws of supply and demand.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief background review on game theory. Section III describes the multiuser single-relay cooperative network model and the Stackelberg game and bargaining game models for the relay pricing and relay power allocation problems. In Section IV, we analyze the relay power pricing and power allocation problems. The optimal relay price is solved analytically, whereas the relay power allocation is transformed into a convex optimization problem. Section V discusses the properties of the proposed solutions and their possible implementation. Simulation results are shown in Section VI. Conclusions and future work are given in Section VII. Table I summarizes the important symbols that are used in this paper.
II. REVIEW OF GAME THEORY
In this section, we provide a brief review of game theory and introduce the basic concepts and results that will be used in this paper.
Game theory mainly analyzes behavior in strategic situations, or games, in which players influence each other's decision and performance [32] . A game consists of three parts: 1) a set of players; 2) a set of actions of the players; and 3) a set of utilities that represent the players' relative satisfaction of the outcome of the game. Equilibrium is the strategy outcome of a game that is the best response of each user given the decision of others. The most famous equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium, in which no player can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its own strategy, and the corresponding strategy set and utilities constitute a Nash equilibrium.
A. Stackelberg Game
In a Stackelberg game, one player acts as a leader who takes action first, and the other players are followers who observe the leader's action and act accordingly. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a Stackelberg game can be found using the backward induction method. It first studies the followers' game: for each possible action of the leader, finding the optimal followers' response that maximizes the followers' payoff. Then, given the optimal followers' response strategy, it studies the leader's action and chooses the one that maximizes the leader's utility. The chosen strategy set is the Stackelberg equilibrium [32] .
B. Bargaining Game and KSBS
A bargaining game models the bargaining interactions of players. In a bargaining problem, there are N players with utilities u 1 , u 2 , . . . u N . A utility vector u = (u 1 u 2 . . . u N ) is called feasible if it is possible to find a strategy set that gives the ith player utility u i for all i = 1, . . . , N. Let S denote the set of feasible utility vectors. The disagreement point, which is denoted as u 0 = (u 1,0 u 2,0 . . . u N,0 ), is the vector of the minimal utility that each player expects if the players do not reach an agreement and play noncooperatively. It is the guaranteed utility for the players in the bargaining game. The ideal point u I = (u Given S, the disagreement point u 0 , and the ideal point u I , players negotiate with each other to select one feasible solution u and the corresponding strategy set that all players agree. Depending on how players define fairness, they may select different solutions. One popular solution for the bargaining game is the KSBS [34] , which is the solution to the optimization problem
for all players with u I i > u i,0 . KSBS is an equilibrium point that guarantees fairness in the sense of equal penalty, which can be derived from the constraint in (1) . Notice that (u I i − u i,0 ) and (u i − u i,0 ) are Player i's maximum and actual net utility gains, respectively. Taking logarithm on both sides of the constraint in (1), we have
As log k is a constant independent of the players, the constraint in (1) forces all participating players to suffer the same quality penalty in the logarithmic scale and thus ensures fairness in this sense. It is worth mentioning that KSBS is neither individual utility optimal nor global optimal in general. It is an equilibrium point that balances the proposed utility measure and fairness among users. III. GAME MODELS FOR RELAY POWER ALLOCATION AND PRICING
In this section, we explain the network model, elaborate on the relay power pricing and relay power allocation problems, and propose game theoretical models for the problems using a Stackelberg game and a bargaining game.
A. Network Model
Consider a wireless network with N users communicating with their destinations with the help of one relay, as shown in Fig. 1 . Denote the channel gain from User i to Destination i (direct link) as h i , the channel gain from User i to relay as f i , and the channel gain from relay to Destination i as g i .
We assume a block-fading (or quasi-static) model: the channels remain invariant over a time slot whose duration is less than the coherence time of the channels but vary across successive slots according to a stationary and ergodic random process. The block-fading model is well justified for vehicular communications (e.g., cooperative high-speed Internet access and media sharing in a vehicle-to-vehicle scenario, where a road access point acts as a relay and helps users forward packets) for rush-hour traffic scenarios. 1 In this paper, we assume that the relay has global and perfect knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) through training and feedback. 2 No CSI is required at the users. User i uses transmit power Q i , and the maximum transmit power of the relay is P .
Frequency-division multiple access is used; therefore, the transmissions of different users are orthogonal and interference free. Without loss of generality, we elaborate the transmission of User i's message on Channel i. We use the popular halfduplex two-step AF relaying protocol. Let s i be the information symbol of User i. It is normalized as E(|s i | 2 ) = 1, where E stands for the average. In the first step, User i transmits √ Q i s i . The signals received by the relay and Destination i are
where n iR and n iD are the additive noises at the relay and the destination in the first step, respectively. In the second step, the relay amplifies its received signal and forwards it to Destination i. Denote the power the relay uses to help User i as P i . Since the relay has perfect CSI, coherent power coefficient is used [30] , [31] . The signal received at Destination i can be shown to be
where n RD is the additive noise at the destination in the second step. All noises are assumed to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) additive circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance.
After maximum-ratio combining of both the direct path and the relay path, the effective received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of User i's transmission can be shown to be
Given the required CSI, the SNR can be calculated using (5) . If User i's transmission is not helped by the relay and only the direct transmission is active, the received SNR of User i's transmission becomes
B. Game Theoretical Models for Relay Pricing and Relay Power Allocation
In this paper, we assume that the transmit power of the relay is limited, and investigate the relay power allocation among users and the relay power pricing. The motivation for imposing a relay power constraint is twofold. First, unlike base stations, relay stations usually are less expensive mobile devises and have limited power. Moreover, regulatory agencies may limit the transmit power of nodes in a network for interference management.
In early relay network designs, many research focused on relay power allocation that optimizes the global network performance. In these models, the relay has no gain and selflessly helps the users using its own power, and the users are also selfless because they care about the global network performance instead of their own benefits. In many practical applications, however, the relay needs incentives for cooperation. Moreover, there is a natural conflict among users who want to obtain help from the relay to maximize their individual benefits. With no payment for the relay power, each user wants as much power as possible, which leads to undesirable situations, e.g., the total power demand from users exceeds the relay power budget. This motivates the use of game theory to model the selfish behavior of the users and the relay. Our goal is to find a fair power allocation among the users and the optimal relay pricing strategy. We use the Stackelberg game to model the interaction between the users and the relay, and the bargaining game to model the relay power allocation among the users, which, as explained in Section II, is a natural fit.
We consider the relay as the leader of the Stackelberg game who sets the price of its power in helping the users. The key point of the relay game is for the relay to set the price to gain the maximum revenue. The relay revenue, which is denoted u R , is the total payment from the users. We use a simple pricing model by assuming that the relay revenue is linear in the amount of power it sells, i.e., u R = N i=1 λP i , where λ is the normalized unit price of the relay power, and P i is the power the relay uses to help User i.
We consider the users as followers of the Stackelberg game that react in a rational way given the unit price of the relay power. The bargaining game is used to model the cooperative interaction among users. That is, we assume that users make agreements to cooperatively share the relay power. A key point of formulating the users as selfish players in a bargaining game is to design the utility function, which should reflect both the quality of service and the payment for service of users. Its physical meaning can be the benefits received by the users. In this paper, we seek to design an appropriate utility function that is not only physically meaningful but is mathematically attractive as well, to ensure tractability and convergence.
We define the utility of User i,
which, for a given network scenario, is a function of P i : the power the relay uses to help User i. The first two terms of (7) correspond to the effective received SNR of User i given in (5) and represent the quality of service of the user. 3 It is directly related to the performance of the communication, e.g., the achievable rate. The last term λP i represents the user's normalized cost in purchasing the relay service. If User i does not buy any power from the relay and uses the direct transmission only, i.e., P i = 0, its utility is the minimum utility that User i expects. Thus
In the following section, we analyze the preceding Stackelberg game and bargaining game models to find the optimal relay power pricing and a fair power allocation among the users.
IV. RELAY POWER ALLOCATION AND PRICING SOLUTIONS
In this section, we solve the power allocation and pricing problems jointly using the backward induction method [32] . That is, we first solve the user game, i.e., the relay power allocation among the users for a given price of the relay power, and then solve the relay game, i.e., the optimal price of the relay 3 Here, we consider applications where a higher SNR means better qualityof-service. One example of such applications is video streaming with MPEG-4 Fine Granular Scalability (FGS), where the quality of the reconstructed video gradually improves as the user receives more bits [33] . In this application, a higher SNR means a higher achievable rate and more correctly received bits; thus, we get better video quality. Strictly speaking, even for this application, the claim that a higher SNR means better quality is only valid for a finite SNR range. Let SNRmax be the SNR level where a video reaches its maximum quality and SNR min be the SNR level where the receiver can receive no useful information about the video. The proposed utility function is to model the behavior within the SNR range of [SNR min , SNRmax].
power, based on the derived user bargaining strategy. The user game and the relay game are formulated and analyzed in the following two sections, respectively.
A. Relay Power Allocation Based on KSBS
The user game is to find the relay power allocation among users for a given unit power price λ. We use the bargaining game in cooperative game theory to find a fair power allocation. Specifically, we look for the KSBS of the bargaining game, the background of which is provided in Section II-B.
We first calculate User i's ideal utility u I i of a given λ. To maximize its utility, User i's goal is
The first constraint in (9) ensures that User i gets no less utility than u i,0 , which is its utility when it receives no help from the relay, i.e., P i = 0. The second constraint ensures that the power demand of User i does not exceed the total power budget P of the relay. Given a relay power price, this optimization problem can be solved analytically, and the result is given in Lemma 1. Lemma 1: Define the price above which User i will not purchase any relay power as
Given the unit relay power price λ, the ideal power demand of User i that maximizes its utility u i in (7) is
The ideal utility of User i is
Proof: From (7), we have
Therefore, u i is a nonincreasing function of P i , and its maximum is reached at P
This proves the ideal power solution in (11) . The results in (11) show that b i is the price above which User i will not purchase any relay power. Using this solution and the equalities (7) and (8), we can obtain the ideal utility for User i in (12) .
From Lemma 1, we see that P I i (λ) is independent of User i's direct link h i . Intuitively, this is because the contribution of the direct link to User i's receive SNR and utility is fixed and keeps unchanged for any amount of relay power that User i obtains.
Lemma 1 also shows that when the price is too high, Case 1 in (11), User i will not buy any relay service. When the price is too low, Case 3 in (11), User i wants to purchase all relay power to maximize its utility. For the price range shown in Case 2 in (11), User i asks for part of the relay power that gives the ideal balance between its SNR and its payment to maximize its utility. The ideal power demand of User i depends not only on the relay power price but also on its power constraint Q i and the quality of its local channels f i and g i . The b i defined in (10), whose value depends on User i's condition only, is an important parameter. As shown in (11), it is the price above which User i will not purchase any relay power. In addition, it also affects how much power a user asks for ideally. We can see b i as a quality measure for User i to some extent. For any two users, User i and User j, assume that b i > b j . We can see that if User i is not allocated any relay power, which happens when b i ≤ λ, User j will not be allocated any relay power either because its b j is smaller. Moreover, for a given price λ, increasing Q i and |f i | 2 of User i, which increases b i , results in higher or the same relay power demand from User i, which is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Given a relay power price λ, P
which is a nondecreasing function of Q i and |f i | 2 for a given λ. For the other two price ranges, when λ
Therefore, in all price ranges max and min are also nondecreasing functions. Therefore, we conclude that P I i (λ) is a nondecreasing function of Q i and |f i | 2 . To find the KSBS of the user bargaining game, without loss of generality, we assume that the users are sorted in descending order of their b i values, that is
With the given price λ, for users satisfying b i ≤ λ, as shown in Lemma 1, their ideal power demand is 0; thus, they do not enter the game. Let L(λ) be the number of users satisfying b i > λ. That is, with the ordering in (13) 
The first L(λ) users will participate in the bargaining game and purchase the relay service. Given λ, to find the KSBS-based power allocation of the L(λ) users is equivalent to solving the following optimization problem [34] :
where u I i and u i,0 , given in (12) and (8), respectively, are the ideal and minimal utilities of User i. The second constraint in (14) is due to the total power constraint of the relay, and the last constraint is to ensure the feasibility of the solution and is derived from rewriting u i > u i,0 .
In the proof of Lemma 1, we have shown that u i is a concave function of P i . Moreover, u i = u i,0 when P i = 0 or 
. Thus, we can shrink the feasible region of
to either one of the smaller regions. We choose the first region for two reasons. First, for the same u i value, this choice results in a smaller P i than choosing the second region, and the users prefer to buy less power to gain the same utility. Second, a smaller power consumption for each user saves relay power, and therefore, more users can be helped. Thus, (14) becomes
To solve this optimization problem, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The relay power allocation problem in (15) is equivalent to the following max-min problem:
Proof: First, we use the notation
To prove this lemma, it is sufficient to show that the power allocation solution in (16) , which is denoted as
We prove this by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose that
. Since ψ 1 (P 1 ), ψ 2 (P 2 ) are increasing and continuous functions of P 1 , P 2 in the feasible region given in (16) , there exists a small enough positive such that P * 1 + , P * 2 − are still in the feasible region and that
The new power allocation (P *
) satisfies all power constraints in (16) . Its max-min value is ψ 1 (P * 1 + ), which is larger than the max-min value of the solution (P * 1 , . . . , P * L(λ) ). This contradicts the assumption that (P * 1 , . . . , P * L(λ) ) is optimal, thus completing the proof. Equation (16) is a convex optimization problem and can efficiently be solved using standard convex optimization techniques [37] . We call the solution of (16) the KSBS-based power allocation. Recall that in (16) , only the L(λ) users whose b i 's are larger than the relay price λ participate in the game. The remaining N − L(λ) users request no relay power.
In the game theoretical model in (16), the power constraint at the relay is taken into consideration. For any relay price λ, (16) will result in a feasible power allocation among users, i.e., the total power demanded by the users does not exceed the relay power constraint. Without the game theoretical model, if, for example, for a given price, the users request their ideal relay powers to maximize their individual utilities, it may happen that the total power demand of the users exceeds the relay power constraint, which is infeasible. With the proposed KSBSbased relay power allocation, when the sum of the ideal power demands of all users does not exceed the relay power constraint, the users will be allocated their ideal powers, in which case, k in (15) reaches its maximum 1; when the sum of the ideal power demands of all users exceeds the relay power constraint, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation will allocate all relay power to the users fairly. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For a fixed λ, let the ideal power allocation of User i be P I i (λ), which is given in (11) , and let the KSBS-based power allocation be P
Proof: Again, we use the notation ψ i (P i ) in (17) . With the new feasible region of P i in (16), ψ i (P i )'s are increasing functions and reach their maximum 1 when P i = P I i (λ). Thus, k ∈ [0, 1] and achieves the maximum k = 1 if and only if
is, when all users can reach their ideal utilities with a feasible relay power allocation. In this case,
, not all users can reach their ideal utilities, and thus, k < 1. From the equivalent form (15), actually no user can reach its ideal utility. That is, P
is a positive number. Now consider the power allocatioñ
First, this new power allocation satisfies all power constraints due to its construction. Moreover, as ψ i 's are increasing functions, the new power allocation results in a higher minimum value, that is,
, which contradicts the assumption that P K i (λ) is optimal. This completes the proof.
B. Optimal Relay Power Price
Now, we investigate the relay pricing problem. The price of the relay power is crucial to the relay revenue and the relay power allocation among the users. If the relay sets the price too high, no user will buy any power, and the relay revenue will be zero. If the relay sets the price too low, all users will ask for as much power as possible, and although all relay power can be sold, the relay revenue will not be maximized.
With the unit price of the relay power λ, from Section III, and by using the KSBS-based relay power allocation in Section IV-A, the revenue of the relay is
is the relay power allocated to User i based on the KSBS for the given price λ. The relay pricing problem can be formulated as
Note that the relay power constraint
≤ P is always guaranteed by the KSBS-based power allocation, thus needing not to appear explicitly in the relay revenue maximization.
To solve the relay pricing problem, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The optimal price is inside the interval [b lb , b 1 ), where b lb satisfies the following equations:
and
Proof: First, we can see that φ(b lb ) monotonically decreases from ∞ to 0 as b lb increases from 0 to b 1 . Thus, (20) has a unique positive solution inside (0, b 1 ).
Then, we prove (21) by contradiction. Assume that (21) is proved. Now, we show that the optimal price is no less than b lb . Using the result in (21) and from (11), when the relay power price is b lb , i.e., λ = b lb , we have
Moreover, from (11) (22) . With the KSBSbased power allocation, according to Lemma 4, all power of the relay will be allocated to the users, i.e.,
The relay revenue maximization when the price is with [0,
which is reached at λ = b lb . Therefore, the optimal price in the
To prove the upper bound on the relay price, note that when λ ≥ b 1 , from (11), P I i (λ) = 0 for all i, i.e., no user will buy any power from the relay and the relay revenue will be 0. Therefore, any price in the range [b 1 , +∞) is not optimal, and the optimal price must be in the range [b lb , b 1 ).
The value of b lb can be obtained by solving the equation in (20) . This is a generalized waterfilling problem [39] 
In what follows, we solve the optimal relay power price analytically. First, several notation are introduced. Recall the ordering of the users based on their b i values in (13) 
Inside the price range
is a nonincreasing function of λ and (20), we have
We can thus rewrite the price optimization problem in (19) 
In (26), we have decomposed the optimization problem into M subproblems, where the ith subproblem is to find the optimal price within the range Γ i where Users 1 to i purchase nonzero power from the relay Sub-problem i : max
The following proposition is proved to solve the subproblem. Proposition 1:
The solution to (27) is
Proof:
of power, and User
(i + 1) to User M will ask for zero relay power. Subproblem (27) can be rewritten as
is the relay revenue given the price λ ∈ Γ i . It can be shown through straightforward calculation that dφ R,i (λ)/dλ = 0 when λ = c i , which is defined in Proposition 1, and
, it reaches its maximum at γ i+1 ; and if γ i+1 ≤ c i ≤ γ i , it reaches its maximum at c i .
With the subproblems solved, we are ready to find the optimal relay power price. The result is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal relay power price, which is denoted as λ * , is
where λ i is defined in Proposition 1.
Proof: This is a natural result of Proposition 1 and (26). With Theorem 1, we can find the optimal price for the relay power by solving the M subproblems in (26) analytically using Proposition 1 and then find the optimal price among the M subproblem solutions that results in the maximum relay revenue. This is written as Algorithm 1. We also would like to clarify that in this paper, an analytical result is found for the optimal relay power price, and our proposed Algorithm 1 requires no iteration or numerical calculation. After ordering (whose average complexity is N log N ), its complexity is linear in the number of users in the network. Thus, our proposed scheme has very low computational complexity and is suitable for vehicular networks with a large number of users and large or moderate coherence intervals.
Previously, we have shown that b i is an important factor for the ideal relay power. Here, we can see that it is also important for the optimal relay price. We prove the following lemma, which further reflects the importance of b i .
Lemma 6: If b 1 < 4b lb , the optimal price for the relay is b lb .
for i = 1, . . . , M. From Proposition 1, within the range Γ i , the optimal price is γ i+1 , the lower bound of Γ i . Therefore, the optimal price in the range
, which is b lb . Lemma 6 says that when the difference between b 1 and b lb is small, that is, the conditions of the users are not too separate apart, the relay should set its price to be low so all users can gain some benefits. On the contrary, when some users have a much higher b i than others, the price will be higher than b lb , and those users with lower b i 's may not purchase the relay service because the price is too high compared with the SNR gain they may receive.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss possible implementation of the proposed relay power allocation and pricing solutions, properties of the power allocation solution, applications of the proposed solutions to some special network scenarios, and extensions to multiuser multirelay networks.
It is assumed in this paper that the users employ orthogonal channels to avoid interference. In reality, there may be more users than channels, and medium access control (MAC) is needed. We can use a straightforward time-division multipleaccess-based channel assignment scheme as follows. Suppose that there are T channels available (for example, the IEEE 802.11G standard specifies three orthogonal channels, thus T = 3) and a total of N > T users in the network. In the MAC layer, the N users are divided into T /N groups. We use the round robin method with shared wireless channels, where each group of nodes transmits in consecutive rounds. In each round, users in the current group use the proposed power allocation and pricing strategy in Section IV to decide the relay power allocation. More research on bandwidth allocation, user scheduling, and joint bandwidth and power allocation can be found in [40] - [43] .
Next, we discuss the implementation of the proposed relay power allocation and power pricing solutions. As discussed in Section III, we assume a block-fading channel model. Within each time slot, a training process is first conducted for the relay to obtain global CSI. Research on efficient channel training and estimation can be found in [45] - [47] . For the relay to know the channel gains from the users to itself, training and channel estimation should be performed at the relay. For the relay to know the channel gains from itself to the destinations, feedback from the destinations to the relay is required. Then, the relay power price and power allocation are updated using Algorithm 1. The proposed algorithm is a centralized one instead of distributed. With this optimal price, the relay finds the KSBS-based solution for the relay power allocation problem given in (16) . With this implementation, we actually assume that the relay is trustworthy. All users believe that the relay will not change the parameter values (e.g., the CSI) but uses the preceding procedure to set the price and determine the KSBS-based power allocation, and follows the results to help all users in their transmissions. Now, we discuss properties of the KSBS-based power allocation. When the relay sets its price to be the optimal, from the analysis in Section IV-B, all users will be allocated their ideal relay powers P I i (λ), and the individual utilities of the users are maximized. This is the ideal case and requires the relay to have perfect CSI. However, in reality, the CSI at the relay is subject to error and delay, in which case, the relay may set a price different from the optimal one. Sometimes, the relay may want to set its price different from the optimal one due to other reasons such as marketing considerations. Our bargaining game model and KSBS-based power allocation are robust to the relay price fluctuation in the sense that a "fair" relay power allocation among the users can still be made. Specifically, if the relay power price is set to be higher than or equal to b lb , as defined in (20), with the KSBS-based power allocation, each user gets its ideal power demand; if the relay power price is set to be lower than b lb , no user can get its ideal relay power, but the relay power will be fairly allocated to the users such that the utility losses of the users are the same in the logarithmic scale; and all relay power will be allocated.
In what follows, we discuss the applications of the proposed solution to two special network scenarios. One is the multiuser, single-relay, and single-destination network, also addressed as multiaccess relay network (MARN) [10] - [16] . The proposed scheme can directly be applied to MARNs by setting g 1 = · · · = g N in network formulation. From Lemma 2, P I i (λ) is a nondecreasing function of Q i and f i . Thus, with the relay to destination channel the same for all users, users with better user relay channels or higher transmit powers will be allocated more relay power. Another popular network scenario is the multiuser single-relay network with no direct links. Our solutions again can be applied straightforwardly as the solutions are independent of the direct link.
Last, we discuss possible extensions of our work to multiuser multirelay networks. A straightforward extension to the multiple-relay network is to divide the network into several independent clusters, where each cluster contains one relay. Then, our result can directly be applied to each cluster. This is a simple but suboptimal solution. There are of course other ways to generalize our results to multirelay networks that allow a user to receive help from multiple relays and/or a relay to help multiple users. One possibility is as follows.
For multirelay networks where all relays belong to the same agent and a total power constraint is assumed, the relays should have the same goal of maximizing the total revenue of all relays; thus, we set a fixed price for all relays.
Assume that there are N users and R relays, and the relays use orthogonal channels. Denote the channel gain from User i to Relay r as f 
Other assumptions and notation are the same as the single-relay case. For the relay power allocation problem, define the utility of User i as
The first two terms of (32) correspond to the effective received SNR of User i, and the last term represents the user's total normalized cost in purchasing service from the relays. Moreover, let u (r)
, which is the minimum utility that User i expects when it does not buy power from the relays.
Similar to the single-relay case, User i's goal is
This is a convex optimization problem and can efficiently be solved using standard convex optimization techniques [37] . The ideal utility of User i can be calculated correspondingly. For the relay power pricing problem, similar to the singlerelay case, we can find a price b lb such that the total ideal power demands of users are P , and any price below b lb is not optimal. When the price is larger than b lb , the KSBS-based power allocation for User i at Relay r is
The optimal relay price problem is equivalent to that of a single-relay network with N × R users purchasing power from one relay with power constraint P and can be solved using Algorithm 1.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we show the simulated performance of the proposed relay power allocation and pricing solutions and compare them with the sum-rate-optimal power allocation and the even power allocation. The sum-rate-optimal power allocation solution is the relay power allocation among users that maximizes the network sum rate. For the even power allocation, the relay allocates 1/N of its total power to each of the N users, and each user decides how much power to buy from the relay to maximize its utility. That is, the relay power allocated to User i is min{P I i (λ), P/N}. Two channel models are considered: 1) the Rayleigh flat-fading channel and 2) the static channel with path-loss only.
A. Network With Rayleigh Flat-Fading Channels
In the first numerical experiment, the channels are modeled as i.i.d. Rayleigh flat fading, i.e., f i , h i , and g i are generated as i.i.d. random variables following the distribution CN (0, 1). We consider a network with three users. The transmit powers of the users are set to be 10 dB. The simulation results follow the same trend for other values of user powers.
We first investigate the network performance when the relay power ranges from 10 to 40 dB. We set the relay power price to be the optimal according to Theorem 1. Fig. 3 shows the optimal relay power price, the relay power actually sold, and the corresponding relay revenue. We can see that when the relay has more power to sell, the optimal relay power price is lower, more relay power is sold, and the relay receives more revenue. This complies with one of the laws of supply and demand [44] , which says that if supply increases and demand remains unchanged, then it leads to lower equilibrium price and higher quantity. Fig. 4 compares the network sum rate and fairness of the proposed KSBS-based power allocation with those of the sum-rateoptimal power allocation and the even power allocation. We set the relay power price to be the optimal according to Theorem 1. It can be seen that for the sum rate, the difference between our algorithm and the sum-rate-optimal solutions is within 3.5%, while it is within 13% between the sum-rate-optimal and the even power solutions. The proposed solution is about 5 dB superior to the even power allocation. To quantify the fairness, we use the average value of the normalized difference:
, where r i is the achievable rate of User i. A smaller difference indicates a fairer solution. We can see that our solution achieves similar fairness to the even power solution and is fairer than the sum-rate-optimal solution.
Next, we examine the trend of the optimal relay price with an increasing demand. From Lemma 2, P I i (λ) is a nondecreasing function of |f i | 2 . Therefore, we can use an increasing |f i | 2 to simulate increasing user demand. In this numerical experiment, we again consider a three-user network and model all channels as independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean. The variances of all g i 's and h i 's are 1, whereas the variance of all f i 's ranges from 1 to 20. A larger variance means a higher average value of |f i | 2 , which on average means a higher power demand from the users. The transmit power of the users is set to be 10 dB, and the relay power is set to be 20 dB. Fig. 5 shows the optimal relay power price, the actual relay power sold, and the corresponding relay revenue with different variances of f i . We can see that as the variance of f i increases, the optimal relay price increases, more relay power is sold, and the relay revenue increases. This fits one of the laws of supply and demand, which says if the supply is unchanged and demand increases, it leads to higher equilibrium price and quantity.
In the third numerical experiment, we examine the relationship between the optimal relay price and the number of users. The relay power is fixed to be 20 dB. The user power is fixed as 10 dB, but the number of users varies from 5 to 15. All channels are generated following the distribution CN (0, 1). Fig. 6 shows the optimal relay power price, the total relay power sold, and the corresponding relay revenue with different numbers of users. We can see that as the number of users increases, the optimal relay power price increases, the relay power actually sold increases, and the relay revenue increases. Fig. 6 verifies the same law as Fig. 5 , which says that if the supply is unchanged and demand increases, it leads to higher equilibrium price and quantity.
B. Static Network With Path-Loss Channel Only
In this section, we study a static network whose channels are deterministic instead of random. The network has three users, one relay, and three destinations. The relative positions of the nodes are shown in Fig. 7 , where the coordinates of Users 1-3, the relay, and Destinations 1-3 are (−15, 3), (−10, 0), (−5, −3), (0, 0), and (5, 3), (5, 0), (5, −3) , respectively. We consider the path-loss effect of wireless channels only by assuming that the channel gains are inversely proportional to the distance squared. In Fig. 7 , User 1 is the farthest from its destination and thus has the worst channel, whereas User 3 is the closest to its destination and has the best channel. The power of the users is set to be 10 dB, and the power of the relay is set to be 15 dB.
In Fig. 8 , the total power sold to the three users, the relay revenue, and the network sum rate are shown as the relay power price varies. Three power allocation solutions are presented: 1) the proposed KSBS-based power allocation; 2) the sum-rateoptimal power allocation; and 3) the even power allocation. Note that the sum-rate-optimal allocation solution aims to maximize the network sum rate, is independent of the relay power price, and allocates all the relay power P to the three users. We can observe from Fig. 8 that, when the price is higher, with the KSBS-based and the even power allocation schemes, the users purchase less power from the relay, and the total power demand is smaller. For example, using the KSBSbased allocation scheme, the total power demand is less than P when the price is higher than 0.0023. Now, let us look at different price ranges separately. First, we can see that in the price range [0,0.0007], both KSBS-based and even power allocation schemes sell all relay power to the users. This is because in this price range, P I i (λ) ≥ P/3 for i = 1, 2, 3; thus, with the even power allocation, each user will buy P/3, and all relay power will be sold; for the KSBS-based power allocation, 3 i=1 P I i (λ) ≥ P , so all power of the relay will be purchased by the users based on Lemma 4. Second, when λ ≥ 0.0047, the even power and KSBS-based schemes give the same power allocation results. This is because in this price range, all three users' ideal power demands are no more than P/3, that is, P I i (λ) ≤ P/3 for i = 1, 2, 3 and 3 i=1 P I i (λ) ≤ P . In this scenario, from Lemma 4, both the even power allocation and the KSBS-based schemes assign the ideal power demand P I i (λ) to User i, and the two schemes have the same performance. Moreover, when λ is in the range [0.0007, 0.0047], the KSBS-based power allocation demands more relay power than the even power allocation, and thus, the relay receives a higher revenue in this range. This is because with the even power allocation, a user cannot request more than one third of the total relay power, while the KSBS-based scheme does not have this constraint and thus enables users to request more power. Furthermore, when λ is 0.0027, the KSBS-based scheme demands 91% of the relay power to be sold to the users, and the relay revenue is maximized. At this relay power price, the network sumrate difference between the proposed KSBS-based solution and the sum-rate-optimal one is only about 2%. The sum-rate difference between the even power and the sum-rate-optimal schemes, however, is 23% at the price λ = 0.0047, which is the relay revenue maximizing price under the even power allocation. For any relay price, the sum-rate difference between the even power and the sum-rate-optimal schemes is no less than 9%.
To further compare the performance of the three schemes, Table II shows the user's individual achievable rate, the normalized rate difference, and the network sum rate with the three power allocation schemes at the relay power prices 0, 0.0013, 0.0027, 0.0047, and 0.0053. As can be seen from Table II , the proposed KSBS-based scheme achieves a smaller normalized rate difference than the sum-rate-optimal solution for all relay prices, while the sum-rate difference between these two is small. This shows that the proposed solution is fairer than the sum-rate-optimal solution with comparable network sum rate. In sum, Fig. 8 and Table II show that for the simulated network, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation and relay pricing solutions achieve close-to-optimal sum rate, at the same time maximizing the relay revenue and achieving fairness among users.
To compare the sum rates of the proposed solutions and the sum-rate-optimal solution, we show in Fig. 9 the network sum rate of the proposed relay pricing and power allocation solutions as the relay power constraint P varies. We can see that when P is small, indicating high demand and low supply, the sum rate of the proposed solution is almost the same as the maximum sum rate of the network. As P increases, indicating low demand and high supply, the sum-rate difference between the proposed solutions and the sum-rate-optimal solution increases. When the relay power is 25 dB, the difference is about 6%. The optimal relay price, on the other hand, decreases as P increases. These verify the same law of supply and demand as Fig. 9 . Sum rate and relay power price in three user relay networks with static channels. Fig. 3 , which says that if supply increases and demand remains unchanged, then it leads to lower equilibrium price.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the relay power allocation problem in a multiuser single-relay network. By introducing a relay power price, we take into consideration the incentives for cooperation at the relay. The Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the relay and the users, in which the relay acts as the leader who sets the price of its power to gain the maximum revenue, and the users act as followers who pay for the relay service. To model the competition among users, a bargaining game and its KSBS are used for a fair power allocation. We analytically solve the optimal relay price, whereas the problem of relay power allocation among users is transformed into a convex optimization problem and can be solved with efficient numerical methods. Simulation results show that our solutions reflect the laws of supply and demand, give better user utilities and relay revenue than even power allocation, and approach the sum-rate-optimal power allocation in terms of network sum rate for a wide range of network scenarios.
